MAR - 7 2012

1	SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
2	COUNTY OF KINGS: CIVIL TERM : PART 32
3	MARGARET HEALY,
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5	Defendants.
6	Index No. 21646/11  360 Adams Street Street
7	Brooklyn, New York March 6, 2012
8	B E F O R E : HONORABLE YVONNE LEWIS,  Justice of the Supreme Court
10	APPEARANCES:
11	MICHAEL J. DEVEREAUX & ASSOCIATES, P.C. Attorneys for the Plaintiff
12	39 Broadway New York, New York 10006
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14	BY: THOMAS J. CHAVES, ESQ.
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18	BY: STANLEY ALTER, ESQ.
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22	Dell Ashby Official Court Reporter
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#### PROCEEDINGS

1 THE COURT CLERK: In the matter of Healey versus 2 O'Hanlon, index number 21646 of 2011. 3 State your appearances for the record. Start 4 with plaintiff. 5 MR. CHAVES: Thomas Chaves for the plaintiff. 6 MR. ALTER: Stanley Alter, Alter & Alter, 300 East 42nd Street, for the defendant. 7 8 THE COURT: Again, good morning to both of you. 9 MR. CHAVES: Good morning. 10 MR. ALTER: Good morning. 11 THE COURT: We are scheduled this morning for 12 closing arguments and determination, if the Court can do so, at the close of arguments. 13 14 I am assuming -- and you'll correct me if I'm 15 wrong -- that you do not wish to submit any writings 16 to the court? 17 MR. ALTER: Not I. 18 MR. CHAVES: Judge, I have to request permission 19 to consult with my client with respect to that issue. 20 THE COURT: Well, that wasn't exactly my 21 question. I didn't make clear exactly what I meant. 22 What I meant was do you have any prepared 23 writings that you want to hand up. 24 MR. CHAVES: No, Judge.

THE COURT: I was not offering for you to do a

written submission. We're ready to proceed. 1 2 MR. CHAVES: Yes, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: You are ready to proceed? I need a moment; I have something I need to make a correction 4 5 on in the computer before we start which should only 6 take a moment. 7 (Whereupon, there was a pause in the 8 proceedings.) 9 THE COURT: Okay, I'm ready. 10 MR. CHAVES: Judge, before we start, can I say 11 something off the record? 12 THE COURT: Come up. 13 (Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was 14 held.) 15 THE COURT: You may proceed whenever you are 16 ready. 17 MR. ALTER: Thank you, your Honor. 18 This is the point in this matter which the Court 19 has called upon us to give closing arguments. I wish 20 to remind the Court that the plaintiff came into this 21 proceeding by an Order to Show Cause seeking 22 injunctive relief at the last moment in their 23 application. However, at a conference at the bench, 24 I indicated I would seek visitation of the dog, Lucy,

during the pendency of the remaining aspects of this

lawsuit.

An evidentiary hearing was conducted with regard to that issue. I do not feel that it is a very complicated matter, Judge. There is no dispute that this dog involved was given to Slaney as a gift in December of 2008. It is a mammal that does not cause Slaney to have an allergic reaction. Slaney is otherwise allergic to dogs.

Slaney maintained the dog, fed the dog, et cetera, from the time she received it as a gift, until August of 2009. Unfortunately, in August of 2009, Slaney's mother instituted a lawsuit against her father for divorce. Slaney and her mother fled the marital home. Slaney testified that she was afraid of her father.

In September of 2009, Slaney testified before a justice of the Supreme Court in Nassau county on a request that Slaney be permitted to go to Baltimore to attend a school that has a polo team. Slaney is an accomplished polo player. Her father contested that application and was represented by Mr. Healy, the husband of the plaintiff in this case, seeking to bar Slaney from leaving New York and going to school.

Justice Diamond in Nassau county after hearing Slaney in camera came out and directed that Slaney be

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permitted to go to school in Baltimore. That was September of two -- or late August, early September, 2009.

Slaney left Lucy, and Lady, another dog she had gotten as a gift from her maternal grandfather, at the marital residence believing that her brothers and father would take care of that dog.

One month later, as testified by Mr. Scharoff, a request was made for the return of the dogs to Slaney. In response to that request, Mr. Scharoff, co-counsel of Mr. Healy, wrote a letter. It's in evidence. That letter indicated and acknowledged that Slaney owns Lucy. But, the father says, you know what, you can't get Lucy back until Slaney has shown to Mr. O'Hanlon's satisfaction that Slaney can care for the dog.

Certainly, Slaney could not care for the dog while away at boarding school. And, certainly, Slaney could not care for the dog living in a small apartment with the mother when she returned from school.

There was no contact with Mr. O'Hanlon, her father, for almost a year and a half. She certainly was not going to contact Mr. Healy, who was her adversary in the Supreme Court representing her

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father seeking to prevent her from going to

Baltimore, and an adversary of her mother. It should
be noted that her mother got custody of Slaney by

Justice Diamond.

We now have a situation where Slaney graduates from the school in Baltimore and learns that the other dog, Lady, died. She then requests the return of the dog. There is no claim, as there couldn't be, that Mrs. Healy was given the dog or entitled to the dog by Mr. O'Hanlon. He had no power of transferring title of the dog to his sister; it was Slaney's dog. So, now what we have is a claim that Slaney abandoned Lucy.

The facts show otherwise. As I just indicated, Slaney, as based upon the letter from her father's lawyer, would not be given Lucy until she was capable of showing that Lucy could be cared for by her. Slaney now lives with her mother, out on the island, in a home that has a large area where the dog is free to run, grow, play and be with Slaney. Slaney is not in school this year. She is planning to go to a college, I believe she testified, almost within walking distance of where she lives.

To defeat the claim of Slaney's right to be with that dog, we now have Mrs. O'Hanlon -- Mrs. Healy

take the stand and say, well, now this dog is a service dog. I trained this dog to be a service dog and I need the dog.

Well, you know, it's very coincidental that she started to train the dog at or about the time she made the claim to exclude Slaney from receiving her dog. She testified that, I believe, it took four to six weeks to train the dog and she got the certificate in January of 2012. This proceeding was started, I believe, in September. That is not an excuse.

If your Honor pleases, this court, I believe, has the jurisdiction and power to direct that Slaney have, at the very least, time with the dog, significant time while this action is pending. And why do I say significant time? Because the plaintiff in this case has sought to delay the prosecution of this case with the understanding or with the thought that by exclusive possession, the longer I have the dog, the better off I will be.

They ran to the Appellate Division seeking a stay of this proceeding, seeking a stay of this hearing, until the appeal was perfected, knowing they would have approximately nine months to perfect an appeal. Depositions, they don't want to go to

depositions even though in a preliminary conference order they were scheduled.

Your Honor, I respectfully submit that the Court exercise it's power and grant Slaney the right to have Lucy at least two weeks out of every month, exclusively, with some arrangements whereby she picks up the dog or the dog is delivered to her. But, she should not be excluded from having her dog which she owns, which was given to her, which she loves, which she trained, and which she cares for.

Thank you very much, Judge.

MR. CHAVES: Thank you, Judge. I'm going to try to respond to all the points that have been made.

As a preliminary matter, jurisdictionally, there is no application pending before the Court that would govern in any fashion properly or which was jurisdictionally made by the defendant --

THE COURT: You might want to rephrase that. I know it's your argument, but there is an application before the Court. There is no written application proffered by the defendant.

MR. CHAVES: Let me rephrase, Judge. There is no motion -- there is no written motion, no written cross-motion, no written Order to Show Cause, there is nothing in writing for this unique and unusual

request that's been made. It severely prejudices plaintiff the way this has come about because the plaintiff had absolutely no idea until two minutes ago specifically what was being sought. Initially and throughout the term of this proceeding, it was a vague, undescribed, unspecified visitation. We had no way to counter what specifically was being requested because we were never notified what specifically was being requested.

Now, even if the insurmountable, jurisdictional problems can somehow be overcome, which we contend is not possible and not conceded, but solely for the sake of argument, if the insurmountable jurisdictional problems can be overcome, any award of visitation would be violative or a violation of plaintiff's civil rights not only under the federal law, the Americans for Civil Disabilities Act, but also under the New York Civil Rights Law, Section 40, and New York Executive Law, Section 296. plaintiff cannot be deprived of her service dog. her right to the service dog is absolute and perempts any notion of visitation that might apply in connection with this case. There is no such thing in the law as visitation with respect to a person's service dog, because a disabled person cannot be

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deprived of their service dog.

Now, defendant's counsel has suggested that it's "coincidental" that the application and the process that led to the certification of Lucy as plaintiff's service dog occurred after the institution of this action. That doesn't change anything. But, there is a long process involved and a doctor being involved, a medical doctor that we heard testimony about from the plaintiff, Dr. Underberg, who had to submit an affidavit swearing under penalty of perjury that there was a real and immediate need for Lucy to become Ms. Healy's service dog due to her medical condition related to vertigo.

And specifically, if one looks at the brochure that was produced -- and this is a matter of public record -- by the New York State Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, concerning service animals and public accommodations in the workplace, he specifically makes reference to what is a service animal. And in part it states that a service animal can pull wheelchairs or carry and pick up things for individuals with mobility impairments and assist persons with mobility-bound impairments.

We have already heard evidence in this case from the plaintiff that she has a mobility impairment with

respect to vertigo and that is what caused the chain of events leading to Lucy being a service dog. In addition to which, she also testified that Lucy is able to assist her with respect to picking up certain items which may be difficult at times for her to pick up.

Respectfully, Judge, our position is that under the federal law that I have already cited, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New York State law, it would be a violation of plaintiff's civil rights under these circumstances to be deprived for any amount of time of her service dog.

Obviously, in another case where there is a contest with respect to ownership of the service dog and the other side is claiming they are the owner of the service dog, during the pendency of the action it would be highly inappropriate, and unfair, and discriminatory to deprive the person who has the service dog and has been recognized as a disabled person of the use of the service dog.

Now, ultimately if the case is decided by a trier of the fact that the plaintiff is not the owner of the dog, that's for another day and that's to be dealt with at another time. Meanwhile, during the pendency, she should not be deprived of this.

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Now, moving forward, there is no such thing and there is no legal rationale or authority for visitation of personal property. And as we all know, under New York law, a dog is personal property. Thus, there is absolutely no case law, no authority of any kind, which states that that is even considered allowable.

Now, your Honor had indicated that you might consider in connection with this case making what you describe as new law holding that a dog is not just personal property and that it has an elevated status above personal property, and that would necessarily entail an analysis if the dog is not personal property with respect to what the best interests of the dog might be in connection with this. And if that standard is applied, the evidence is overwhelming that there should be no visitation at this time. It goes beyond, way beyond the circumstances that defendant's counsel has described with respect to what actually occurred. We're not here to try a divorce action. That has nothing to do with what we're here to do in this court. And in fact, defendant's counsel had signed a stipulation indicating that matters related to the divorce should be kept in the divorce court, which is where they

belong.

We've heard evidence in this case that Ms. O'Hanlon, who at the time I believe was sixteen or seventeen years of age, left in the dead of night with her mother for whatever reason she felt she needed to do so. The dog was left there. Now her position seems to be she cared for the dog before she left in the middle of the night. However, her concept, it seems to me from what I recall of her testimony, is that her two brothers who were older than her and of college age would take care of the dog after she left with the mother, which was at the end of the summer. The problem with that whole argument or statement is that her two older brothers were in college, and they were in college in Cincinnati. So, obviously the idea they could take care of this dog makes no sense.

Now, she went to Baltimore to a boarding school. And like every other school, they have vacations, they have breaks, all kinds of time free. During the entire time she was a student at this high school or boarding school for two years, she made no effort whatsoever to have any contact with the dog. None.

So, therefore, if one applies the standard of best interests of the dog, there is no way that

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anybody rationally could consider it would be in the dog's best interests to be foisted into an environment with people that the dog probably doesn't even remember at this point.

The dog was essentially a puppy, eight months of age, when the plaintiff and her mother left for whatever reason. The testimony in this case from the plaintiff is that the dog was not trained in any way, shape or form. Anyone who knows anything about dogs, and I think it's a matter of public record, Judge, knows that a puppy needs to be trained; that a puppy needs to be housebroken; that a puppy needs to be cared for in a hundred different ways.

Ms. O'Hanlon ever did any of that because when Ms. Healy was given the dog to care for the dog as a temporary measure, the dog was not housebroken, the dog was not trained, and so forth. Ms. Healy took it upon herself to do the appropriate steps necessary to take care of the dog that Ms. o'Hanlon should have done earlier. And she's not an infant, Judge, respectfully, she's an adult now. And she was very close to being an adult at the time when this whole thing happened. There is no argument that can be made rationally she was not in a position where she

could have trained the dog. Clearly, she could have.

And notably absent from any testimony anywhere is the role of the mother in this. Where is the mother? We have heard no testimony about her involvement, lack of involvement, and so forth. She supposedly went to a two-bedroom apartment, then to a very large, probably, McMansion in Manhasset. There is no evidence whatsoever that either of these places is inappropriate for a dog to at least come and visit.

At no time other than something through a divorce letter -- a letter that the divorce lawyer wrote that he doesn't even remember writing, there was no contact with respect to the dog.

Now, anyone who knows anything about dogs knows that an owner, in general, is very attached to the dog and has a way to be in contact with the dog either through trying to arrange to see the dog, trying to have the dog brought to them for a little visit, things along those lines; it's a very close relationship. In this case, nothing occurred for years. This is not a situation where it was a couple of weeks.

We heard testimony from the plaintiff that she took the dog with the understanding she would take

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care of the dog for a while and that she would return the dog at the point in time when it was appropriate to do so. She never foresaw and nobody foresaw that there would be a complete abandonment of this property. But, we're not getting to the ultimate issue here, the purpose of today is a limited hearing with respect to visitation. And there is some serious issues with respect to that.

Now, once the court, if it does decide that it wants to order some type of visitation, makes the giant step beyond what the law allows, and the giant step beyond what the best interests of the dog are, there is absolutely no evidence that foisting the dog, literally, taking the dog away from it's only known owner that has cared, loved and taken care of this dog for the last two and a half years, in some unspecified location on the eastern inlet of Long Island that is allegedly an appropriate place for the dog but which there is really not much evidence about other than supposedly it's a big area. There is no testimony whatsoever. And Ms. O'Hanlon certainly had an opportunity to do that, to testify before the court and say to the court this is going to be my schedule day to day; this is when I'm going to get up; this is what time I'm going to walk the dog; this

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is what time I'm going to feed the dog; I'm going to feed the dog twice a day; walk the dog two, three times a day; I'm going to take the dog at night before I go bed and will put the dog in a crate or the dog is going to be loose in the house. None of that testimony that, in general, any rational dog owner would testify about seeking to have the dog come into their house. None of that was heard.

Zero. So, respectfully, Judge, there is absolutely no basis under any theory to have that occur.

Now, just a few more minutes. And I sincerely thank the court for allowing me the latitude to go into all the points that I have, and I apologize to the extent that I'm being repetitive.

I've already covered the fact there is no recognized right under New York law. I'm going to move forward from that.

With respect to the equitable powers of the court, I guess in theory that could occur.

With respect to ordering some type of visitation, but as stated, again, that would be a violation of Ms. Healy's civil rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and corresponding New York law. Moreover, it would not be in the best interests of Lucy.

Now, balancing the equitable considerations concerning visitation, as I've just explained at length, there really isn't any rational basis to think that the dog would somehow be helped in any way, shape or form to be dragged to some unspecified location on the eastern inlet of Long Island. There is absolutely no evidence with respect to that.

Now, moving forward, another point that the Court should consider aside from everything else that I've already covered is the fact that Ms. Healy has devoted herself almost one hundred percent to the care, maintenance, upkeep and love of this dog for the past two and a half years. Ms. Healy does not work at this time. She has not worked since the dog came into her life, so to speak.

Moreover, her husband, Mr. Healy, is a retired lawyer. And he seems to be criticized constantly in connection with this case, and I'm not sure exactly why, because of whatever he did in the divorce action or didn't do as the "attorney of record," even though I believe defense counsel is aware that he is not a divorce lawyer; that before he retired as a lawyer he worked for a corporate law firm for thirty or forty years. He was not involved with divorce. I think his role in the other case (A) is irrelevant; and (B)

is minimal. So, I think that's a complete non-starter with respect to anything, Judge.

Now, another aspect that should be considered in connection with this is that there is no indication whatsoever with respect to what specifically

Ms. O'Hanlon is going to do or not do. Now, she went to a very prestigious, private boarding school which focuses on people who are interested in horses. I don't know a lot about this school. It's not a famous school like Phillips Exeter or Choate,

Lawrenceville; I don't know a lot about this school.

It's fair to say that most of the people that go to this school, though, then do go to college; it's a college preparatory school.

She has not explained in any way, shape or form what her plan is. I don't think that Nassau County College is within walking distance of her house. It may be close, but I don't think it's walking distance.

Moreover, I believe this location she is living in, supposedly, is in the eastern end of Long Island, in Suffolk County. But, be that as it may, it would be very unfair and prejudicial to Lucy to have to kind of be thrown into something, and very prejudicial and harmful to the plaintiff because she

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wouldn't even know exactly how this thing is going to work.

If, in fact, Ms. O'Hanlon really sincerely wanted to have this dog, she would have done things over the past two and a half years to at least stay in touch with this dog.

There is dog sentient. Being so, although the law considers it property, it's not the kind of property that someone can rent a storage locker for, put it in the storage locker and then come back sometime later and pick up the property. This property needs to be cared for. This property needs to be loved. And actually even though the law doesn't consider a dog more than property, at least with respect to the criminal law it's a crime to kill a dog and it has a special consideration with respect to that that is beyond property. It's also a crime to commit cruelty to any animal.

So, the law does recognize in some respects that an animal, a dog, is more than property, per se, because obviously you can't be cruel to property, that I'm aware of.

Now, with respect to Lucy's specific needs with respect to her diet and what her current situation is, when she's fed, when she's walked and so forth,

there is no testimony whatsoever from Ms. O'Hanlon with respect to what she would do. Contrast that with Ms. Healy who explained at length what she does everyday with the dog, how her living situation accomodates the dog, because she has an unusual situation of an open, contiguous apartment in a building here in Brooklyn, in addition which she makes it a point everyday to take the dog out on long walks. She was very clear and specific with respect to what she has done.

Now, the other and final point, Judge, is that we did hear evidence in this case that Ms. O'Hanlon went to visit a friend, she testified, in Florida who was involved in polo of some kind of other. I don't want to go into a long-standing thing about what polo is or isn't; it's not a sport I know a lot about.

However, I do know unlike certain other sports, it's not widely played, it has very specific restrictions in terms of the need of a horse, training of a horse, location to play and so forth. And in order to accommodate her interests in that, it may be necessary for her to travel. And therefore, there is no evidence with respect to who would take care of the dog in her absence.

Again, going back to the issue and the notable

absence of testimony of the other defendant,

Ms. McCarthy, Ms. O'Hanlon -- the wife of the

brother, whatever title you want to give her or name;

We've called her Ms. McCarthy for purposes of this

case -- we have no idea what she does, what she

doesn't do. We have no idea about her schedule.

Nothing.

So, Judge, if you factor in all the different factors that I have given, equitable and legal, we respectfully request that your Honor deny the application in all respects. Thank you.

THE COURT: In keeping with our sidebar conference, you may respond.

MR. ALTER: Thank you, Judge. I'll try to be brief.

I would like to address one thing before I get into the merits and that's the constant statement that there is a stipulation that none of the divorce proceedings between Mrs. O'Hanlon and Mr. O'Hanlon would be part of this proceeding. I have never signed a stipulation to that effect and I look forward to seeing a copy, sir.

Now, moving on, Judge, we now have a claim that there will be a civil rights violation. But, in that statement made by counsel, it might be different if

it were a question of title.

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If the Court remembers, Ms. Healy went on the stand acknowledging the receipt of the letter of October 15th, which she read, understood, and agreed In effect, it was sent or a copy was sent to with. her husband as co-counsel. And the attempt to minimize Mr. Healy's role as co-counsel is misplaced because Mr. Healy has attended every proceeding in that divorce action, every deposition in that divorce action, issued subpoenas in that divorce action, Judge, is so steep in that matter it is unbelievable. So, the claim that he doesn't know why Mr. Healy is being mentioned, he's being mentioned because Mr. Healy knew that Lucy was owned by Slaney. Mr. Healy knew that Lucy was going to be given to his wife to care for and that title would not pass to her. And in the letter that she acknowledged and agreed to, there is no time limitation placed in that letter for which Mrs. Healy would be caring for this dog.

We talk about title. Title hasn't shifted.

Title has not shifted in this case. What we have is a claim that I have a service dog, which that service dog, we have to understand Ms. Healy testified that for five years she had this condition. She has had

four other dogs. She has never trained any of the four other dogs to be a service dog but now that this proceeding started, what a wonderful way to throw a roadblock up to prevent Slaney from seeing her dog. It's a sham.

If your Honor please, we heard from counsel there is no indication as to how Slaney would care for her dog. The testimony was she cared for her dog for eight months before she left the house. Are they suggesting that Slaney is going to be cruel to this dog? That Slaney is in some way going to mistreat this dog? If she had no interest in this dog, she would not be here fighting for visitation to be with her dog. She would have not requested the return of her dog.

The letter by her father, on behalf of her father by her father's lawyer or lawyers, makes it very clear that the only time Slaney is getting this dog back is when her father, her father, deems it that she will be able to care for her dog. That was their plan. Her father who has not spoken to her for two years. And when she requested the dog back from her father, this proceeding was instituted.

Your Honor, my counsel, adversary counsel, said some nondescript place in eastern Long Island where

Slaney is going to live. She gave the address. It's on the record.

She described the household. She described the area where this dog can go out and play, and not walk around five contiguous apartments within the apartment. I think it's a shame that the godmother of Slaney would take it upon herself to attempt to deprive this young lady of her dog. And I think it's a shame that they resist at this late stage that Slaney have some contact with her dog.

And the reason that we bring up the issue of title to the dog is to give the Court a basis to understand that her claim or rights to visitation has merit and that she sought to get this dog back within one month of leaving the household, and her father and lawyers came up with the scheme of depriving her of the dog, the letter of October, I believe, 13, 2009.

Judge, there is no impediment for this court to grant Slaney the right to be with her dog. This dog is not going to be abused. This dog will be cared for. Slaney has indicated on the stand that she loves animals. And all the roadblocks attempted to be put in the path, I think is just shameless.

Thank you, Judge.

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THE COURT: The parties have put a significant amount of evidence before the court. I would like to give an opportunity to counsel and request that I meant to ask, frankly, before I pose rebuttal from --well, rebuttal would be the wrong word, reply comments from the defense given our sidebar conversation. I need to know before I make a final determination -- I would like to have or give counsel the benefit of informing the court of what evidence you believe is in this record that indicates the disability of Mrs. Healy.

MR. CHAVES: Can I answer that, Judge? Can I answer that?

THE COURT: That's my question.

MR. CHAVES: I can try to answer it, Judge.

It's a matter of public record --

THE COURT: The evidence in the record of her disability.

MR. CHAVES: The evidence in the record is that Lucy is qualified as her service dog. So, in other words, that would not have occurred without Dr. Underberg, again, her treating physician, swearing an affidavit submitted to the New York City Department of Health indicating she needed a service dog. Without that medical evidence, someone cannot obtain

1 a service dog.

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Now, we didn't bring Dr. Underberg to testify for purposes of this hearing, but inferentially we know what the process is. It's sort of like saying someone is a lawyer and we know they are a lawyer because they took the bar exam, passed it and were admitted. So, it's the same kind of analogy.

In order to become a service dog, you have to have medical evidence supporting there is a need to have a service dog in the first place. There is a long process that occurs with respect to becoming a service dog, for the dog itself. But, before you even get to that, there has to be a need for the dog to become a service dog of a particular person.

So, Judge, respectfully, the evidence is the certificate, the letter from the New York Department of Health with respect to Lucy becoming a service dog for the plaintiff, and the license attached thereto.

THE COURT: I didn't overlook an affidavit from the doctor?

MR. CHAVES: No. There was no affidavit.

THE COURT: I misunderstood. I thought I heard you say that.

MR. CHAVES: If this were a full-blown trial where there was a need for that type of evidence,

obviously, we would have called the doctor. But, for this limited purpose, we felt it was not necessary.

THE COURT: I understand. No, I understand.

Although this proceeding has been characterized as unusual, on the rights of personal property it seems to this Court that is au contraire. I think you would find steep in case law to the extent that it verges on the consideration of a dog, that a dog is considered man's best friend in the United States of America, and that in many ways a dog is not considered — or, is considered more than personal property inasmuch as there are laws with respect to how this "personal" property can be treated.

In this case and as a result of this hearing, it seems to this court several things: That there are probably very strong feelings of love and care both on the part of the defendant and on the part of the plaintiff with respect to Lucy. The Court considered some of the -- well, considered the standard for a preliminary injunction perhaps in reverse in trying to determine whether or not it made sense to have visitation in this case. So, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the motion for preliminary injunction, in order to determine that visitation will be appropriate or inappropriate, the Court needed to

look at things like what is the likelihood of success on either side in this case.

The Court also did look at the testimony of both sides with respect to their feelings about the dog, the opportunity, and the argument made by counsel that this Court has no jurisdiction, one, because there is no written application and, secondly, though arguably slightly different, that the Court cannot remove the dog because this is a service dog.

First, I determine that the Court does have jurisdiction because in it's attempt to withdraw the motion for preliminary injunction, the parties are not in control of any oral application that may have been made during the course of this action, and the Court does have oral application and a subsequent hearing with evidence on the question from which to make a determination.

As to the best interests of the dog, I don't think there is such a standard yet made. I do not think that we can automatically analogize in the best interests of a child to in the best interests of a dog. And so to the extent that it has not existed prior, I guess this court is making it up.

Before I indicate if at all I indicate what that is, I think I quickly need to talk about whether or

not there is -- whether or not we go to such a standard, and whether or not there is a preliminary consideration before we try and figure out the best interests of the dog, and whether or not it's a standard I'm going to use.

This case thus far and on the basis of the hearings just recently had appears to suggest that the court -- well, counsel is suggesting that the court could not have the ability to take this dog from -- or the visitation rights for this dog because Lucy is a service animal. It seems apparent to this court that if Lucy is a service animal in the way that counsel would have this court perceive, that is, an animal that is absolutely necessary to the well-being of Mrs. Healy, there would need to be a show of evidence of her disability.

The court takes to -- the court credits the testimony that there have been many dogs in Ms. Healy's life since she became aware of her vertigo, and that as far back as 2005, she was aware of it. There is little or no testimony of any attacks since then. There is no medical evidence of the disability from any medical professional. So, the Court does not believe that the designation by plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel of Lucy as a

service dog is such that the court must accept it.

In light of the ability and the existence of the disease long before Lucy came into the household, in light of the fact there has been no greater need shown for a service dog until such time as this proceeding, this action, was brought forth, the Court does not feel that it must treat Lucy as a service dog.

I don't think it is best for this Court to determine what would be the standard for consideration and entitlement in the best interest of the dog because, you see, I, unlike the two parties before me, am not an avid dog lover. I do care about animals, I do, and am very much aware of the attachment that persons and families have made to their dogs and other pets. And as I started with, it seems to me that both parties here are -- have shown, rather, a great deal of attachment and desire to be with a pet that each of them call their own. I see no deterrent in the way of suspected harm either to Ms. Healy or to Lucy in ordering visitation.

On the issue of likelihood of success with respect to the final outcome in this action, which I think this court has to make in order to determine that visitation might be the wrong thing, it seems to

me that there is at least a sufficient likelihood of success to warrant the Order of visitation in this case. I believe, also, that the distance between the plaintiff and defendant in this case warrants the consideration of the requested visitation, that is, be significant enough so that attachments in both areas can be maintained and/or developed, and that it would be less of a hardship, if you will, on Dury if we did a few days a week as opposed to a significant period of time at once.

Counsel asked for two weeks out of the month without any specification as to whether or not that be solid or every other week. I would entertain from counsel, prior to the drafting of the Order and at sidebar in a moment, what you desire because I got no request for limitation from the plaintiff. But, this Court does hereby order visitation to be determined after this sidebar I'm about to have with counsel.

Come up, please.

MR. CHAVES: Would I have an opportunity to consult with my client before the sidebar?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CHAVES: May I do that outside?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. CHAVES: Thank you, Judge.

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(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

THE COURT: You want to come up here or  $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$ 

MR. CHAVES: No. Judge, I would like to be heard on the record.

THE COURT: Make your record.

MR. CHAVES: Judge, thank you for giving us the opportunity --

THE COURT: Well, the record should reflect because I don't think it does reflect we took a break allowing counsel to consult -- specifically allowing plaintiffs' counsel to consult with his clients, probably, about ten minutes.

MR. CHAVES: Thank you, Judge. I just wanted to thank the Court for allowing me the opportunity to consult with my client. And after consultation with the client, I would like to make the following statement: First, I respectfully request that any Order of visitation only start in two weeks, that it not be started before two weeks from whatever date your Honor decides to enter an Order ordering visitation.

And we also seek a stay of whatever Order your Honor signs and enters so that we can go to the Appellate Division and make an application for a motion for leave to appeal with respect to that

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issue, which at this point will not be an interim Order, I believe it would be a final Order with respect to visitation and therefore, possibly, would be appealable as a right we would seek. If it's not appealable as a right, we would make a motion in the Appellate Division to have the Appellate Division consider than on an expedited basis.

So, those are the two requests that I make initially, Judge, and I would respectfully request for purposes of the record when you do rule, that you rule on those specific requests.

Now, with respect to the visitation itself, the plaintiff requests respectfully that she be present and supervise the entire visit by Ms. O'Hanlon. Lucy has bonded closely to Ms. Healy because of the daily contact over the last two and a half years. Lucy is trained and certified as Ms. Healy's service dog. If Ms. Healy is not present, Lucy may try to escape and find her creating the risk that Lucy may escape from Ms. O'Hanlon to find Ms. Healy and become lost, injured or killed on the streets.

We respectfully request that visitation must be during normal daylight hours, up to one hour, once per month, and a mutually agreed upon time.

THE COURT: One hour, one time a month? I just

want to understand.

MR. CHAVES: One hour, once a month. One hour a month. Up to one hour a month.

We respectfully request that the only persons allowed to be present during the visitation with Lucy are Ms. Healy and Ms. O'Hanlon, no other relatives, friends, lawyers or other persons may be present.

We also respectfully request that the visitation should be one in the many parks near Ms. Healy, the plaintiff's home. Lucy becomes easily carsick even on short rides.

Visitation should not be in Ms. Healy's home. She has a safety and security concern that

Ms. O'Hanlon will become familiar with several of the entrances, doormen, security systems and other features in her co-op building. We already had a situation back in September where Ms. o'Hanlon and her mother appeared and that led to this whole confrontation which led to the Order to Show Cause and the recent Order granted by Judge Ash and then withdrawn here.

There is also a concern that it be very clear in the Order that whatever visitation is granted, that when the visitation period is over, that the dog go back to Ms. Healy. There is a concern that the

plaintiff has that either Ms. O'Hanlon or her mother, Ms. McCarthy, will abscond with the dog. And obviously, we object strongly to that even being a consideration or a possibility, that the dog -- not only that they take the dog somewhere but they ship There has already been some testimony in this case that Ms. McCarthy is originally from the country of the Republic of Ireland where many of her family members live, and there is a concern since there has been frequent contact, she travels there frequently and has many relatives there that the dog not be transported to the Republic of Ireland or anywhere else outside of the very strict confines of whatever visitation Order your Honor enters.

Thank you.

THE COURT: I don't think your request is on the record.

MR. ALTER: My request is a two-week consecutive period, alternating weeks. Can I just briefly comment on what was requested by counsel?

THE COURT: Uhmm --

MR. ALTER: Both as to the stay and --

THE COURT: Well, as to the stay because that's a different thing, not as to the --

MR. ALTER: No, I'm not going into limitations

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and restrictions, that's no visitation.

Judge, in regards to the stay to enable counsel to go to the Appellate Division, this is just another -- it was anticipated. It's anticipated that there would be an attempted delay by whatever means will be employed.

I request that the Court when it issues an Order, issues that the defendant, Slaney, has immediate visitation with her dog. And if in fact counsel wants to go to the Appellate Division, then he will work and get his appeal up to go to the Appellate Division. This Court should not aid any further delay of this issue.

Thank you.

THE COURT: The court does not see the request for the stay as a delaying tactic. Perhaps, as a notice tactic to the court. I would expect that an appeal of this court's Order would be taken by one party or the other, notwithstanding which way the Court went.

I do not believe that this Order is a final Order of the court and very much like visitation rights in most proceedings I determine during the course, because the dog is not a child. But, it may be.

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I will stay the implementation for two weeks, but I will not stay this proceeding pending the application and determination of appeal -- or, determination of appeal.

I want a Short Form Order. It will be entered forthwith, which means that it will be probably effective tomorrow. So, two weeks from tomorrow -- yes, two weeks from tomorrow, this court will have ordered -- effective two weeks from tomorrow, visitation for two weeks on, two weeks off.

The visitation does not have to be supervised.

The parties should meet in a place mutually

determined by counsel right now, such that it can

appear in the Order, to exchange possession of Lucy.

You need to write that up, but the two of you need to determine, which may mean you need to go back to your client and you to your clients, where they should meet. You have about three minutes to do that so --

MR. CHAVES: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: You need to think in terms of trying to be equidistant. I'm not talking about one going out to Long Island and I'm not talking about them coming all the way into Brooklyn.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

THE COURT: Do you have an agreement as to a place?

MR. CHAVES: Yes and no. I would just like to state for the record, my client, given the reasons already stated, service dog, close relationship and those other issues, respectfully requests that defendant, Slaney O'Hanlon, and the mother, both who are young and able, come in from Brookville, wherever that is in eastern Long Island, to their apartment at Brooklyn Heights and that's where the transfer take place. That's our first request.

THE COURT: The last thing I said to all of you is that is not acceptable.

MR. CHAVES: I will move on then, Judge. I have confirmed with my clients and conferred with defendant's counsel, and it appears to be a consensus that it can occur at a restaurant known as Mojave Restaurant in Astoria, Queens, which the defendant, Ms. McCarthy, has some type of ownership interest in. And her counsel has indicated that would be amenable.

The only thing that hasn't been worked out is when that would take place. In other words, we prefer it take place during the day. We don't want to be inconvenienced of having to go there at night, at a certain date, and a certain time that is

1 mutually agreed upon.

MR. ALTER: Your Honor, there is no problem with regard to having it in the daytime. The visitation can start on a Saturday morning, carry over to the two-weeks period and be returned on a Saturday morning.

THE COURT: Well, if it's two weeks, then it would have to be two weeks from Saturday coming, I suppose.

MR. ALTER: This is the Order that I prepared as the first visit on whatever agreed date it would take place --

THE COURT: It should also indicate time of day that reflects a daylight time that is as close as possible agreeable to both sides. Write that please and thank you.

MR. CHAVES: I think we have come up with an Order that is mutually agreeable.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE TO BE WITH CERTIFICATION)

THE COURT: Let me wish you all the best on this.

MR. ALTER: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. CHAVES: Thank you, Judge. Thank you for

your courtesy.

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of the within proceedings.

DELL ASHBY
Official Court Reporter